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Abstract— MANET is a collection of the mobile nodes which form a dynamic and temporary network without the use 
of centralized network infrastructure. MANETs make use of the routing protocols for controlling the nodes and 
routing of the packets between the nodes. Due to certain characteristics- dynamic topology, open sharable wireless 
medium, battery constraints and limited security, the nodes in MANET are susceptible to various attacks. In this paper, 
the complete aspect of the MANETs- characteristics, fundamental problems, routing protocols, security leaks and 
attacks in MANET along with the future trends has been discussed in detail. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
An ad hoc network is a type of decentralized wireless network. The term „ad hoc‟ means „for a particular purpose‟ or 
„temporary basis‟. Hence, the ad hoc network does not rely on any pre-existing infrastructure like routers, access points 
etc. Each node in the network participates in routing by forwarding data for other nodes. Ad hoc network is referred as 
network having all devices of equal status with a freedom to associate with any other node within the network range.  
Mobile Ad hoc network (MANET) is an infrastructure-less ad hoc network. It is basically a collection of mobile nodes 
or devices that communicate with each other without the use of predefined infrastructure. MANET is referred as a self-
configuring and adaptive network in which each device is free to move independently in any direction. These nodes can 
dynamically set up the path among themselves to transmit the data packets temporarily. Nodes within each other‟s range 
can communicate directly while the nodes outside each other‟s range make use of relay nodes. The relay nodes are just 
like other nodes that forward/relay the messages from the source node to the destination node. Hence, a node acts as a 
router [1], [6]-[7]. 
 
Fig. 1 Mobile ad hoc network [18] 
 
There are certain key characteristics of the MANET [4], [12]: 
  All the nodes act in a peer to peer fashion without having any centralized controller. 
  As the nodes move randomly because of mobility nature, hence the topology also keeps on changing. 
  The nodes are resource constrained in terms of battery power, bandwidth and energy consumption. 
  The communication can be set up easily between the nodes because of their co-operative nature, i.e. acting as 
router. 
Due to these reasons, MANETs play a significant role in certain application areas- military environment, disaster relief 
operations  or rescue operations,  mining operations, business  meetings, data acquisition,  virtual classroom sessions, 
electronic payments, vehicular computing etc [9], [12].  
Hence, MANETs are categorized as [8]: Dhiman  et al., International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Science and Software Engineering 3(10), 
October - 2013, pp. 1-12 
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A.  Closed MANET 
All the nodes in the network co-operate with each other towards a common desired goal. A new node can join only 
after having permission from the authorized nodes already in the network. Military application is an example of closed 
MANET. 
 
Fig. 2 Military application of MANET [19] 
 
B.  Open MANET 
Each node in the network has its own operational goals. The nodes are free to join and leave the network. Virtual 
classroom session is an example of open MANET. 
 
Fig. 3 Open MANET system [20] 
 
In this paper, Section II provides the details of the routing protocols. Section III refers to the security leaks, Section IV 
deals in the various attacks in MANET and Sections V highlights the conclusion and future aspects in MANET. 
 
II.  ROUTING PROTOCOLS 
Routing is defined as the mechanism of forwarding packet towards its destination using most efficient path. Each node 
in MANET makes use of routing protocols for transmission and forwarding of the messages. Hence, acts as a specialized 
router itself. Routing depends on various factors like topology, selection of routers, initiation of request etc which serve 
as a heuristic in finding the path quickly and efficiently [21].  
 
In MANETs, there are three types of routing protocols [9], [10]: 
A. Pro-active (Table Driven) Protocols 
They attempt to maintain up-to-date routing information of the whole network prior to the requirement. Hence, the 
route can be selected immediately but resulting in higher bandwidth and slow reaction. DSDV, OLSR, WRP, FSR are 
some of the pro-active protocols.  Dhiman  et al., International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Science and Software Engineering 3(10), 
October - 2013, pp. 1-12 
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  DSDV- Destination-Sequenced distance vector is a hop-by-hop distance vector routing protocol which requires 
each node to periodically broadcast routing updates. Every mobile node maintains a routing table for all the 
possible destinations within the network and the number of hops to each and every destination. Every entry is 
marked  by  a  particular  sequence  number  as  assigned  by  the  destination  node  which  enables  the  nodes  to 
differentiate between the stale routes and fresh routes. Hence, it helps in preventing the formation of routing 
loops. The routing table updates are periodically transmitted throughout the network for maintaining consistency 
in it [22]. 
  WRP- Wireless routing protocol uses an improved version of Bellman Ford distance vector routing algorithm. 
Each  node  in  the  network  maintains  four  tables-  distance  table,  routing  table,  link  cost  table  and  message 
retransmission list. Each entry in the routing table comprises of the distance to the destination node, predecessor 
and successor along the paths to the destination and a tag for state identification. Storing the information related to 
predecessor and successor in the routing table helps in the detection of the routing loops, hence avoiding the 
counting-to-infinity problem [23]. 
  OLSR- Optimal Link State Routing protocol exchanges topology information with other nodes regularly. Each 
node  in  the  network  selects  a  set  of  its  neighbors  as  the  “multipoint  relay  nodes”  (MPR)  [23]  which  are 
responsible for forwarding of the control traffic by reducing the number of transmissions required. Nodes selected 
as MPR play an important role in declaring link state information periodically. 
  FSR- Fisheye State Routing is an implicit hierarchical routing protocol which makes use of “fisheye” technique to 
reduce the size of the information required to represent graphical data. It maintains a topology map at each node 
[23].  A  link  state  table  is  maintained  at  each  node  which  keeps  an  up-to-date  information  received  from 
neighboring nodes and periodically exchanges it with local neighbors only. Hence, there is no flooding of the link 
state packets.  
 
B. Reactive (On-demand) Protocols 
These protocols eliminate the need of any prior updating in the routing table. The route is discovered when demanded 
by flooding route request. Hence, resulting in less consumption of bandwidth but higher time for route discovery leading 
to congestion. AODV, DSR, ABR, LAR, TORA are some of the on-demand routing protocols. 
  AODV- Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector routing protocol does not involve nodes that are not on active path 
for maintaining routes to the destination node. Different route messages like RREQ, RREP and RERR are used to 
discover and maintain links.  It makes use of the Dest_SeqNo (destination sequence number) for creation of each 
new route to the destination node. A route with maximum sequence number is selected. To find a new route the 
source node sends RREQ message to the network till destination is reached or a node with fresh route is found. 
Then RREP is sent back to the source node. The nodes on active route communicate with each other by passing 
hello messages periodically to its immediate neighbor. If a node does not receive a reply then it deletes the node 
from its list and sends RERR to all the members in the active members in the route [21]. 
  DSR- Dynamic Source  Routing protocol is based on source routing in  which a sender determines the exact 
sequence of nodes through which to propagate a packet. The header of the packet contains the list of intermediate 
nodes for routing. Every mobile maintains a route cache. When a node wants to send a packet to another node in 
the network, it checks its route cache first for a source route to the destination. When a route is found, the sender 
uses this route to propagate the packet else the source node will initiate the route discovery process [24].  
  LAR- Location aided routing protocol aims to reduce the routing overhead by the use of location information. 
Position information will be used by LAR for restricting the ﬂooding to a certain area. Every node needs to know 
its physical location which is achieved by the Global Positioning System (GPS). Since the position information 
always includes a certain amount of small error, GPS is currently not capable of determining a node‟s exact 
position. Therefore, differential GPS5 is preferred to offer accuracies but it works within only a few meters [24]. 
  TORA- temporally ordered routing algorithm is basically used for routing IP datagrams within an autonomous 
system. It belongs to the family of “link-reversal” algorithms. It is structured as a temporally ordered sequence of 
diffusing computations and each computation comprises of a sequence of directed link reversals. TORA‟s reaction 
to link failures involves a localized single pass of the distributed algorithm which is achieved by the use of 
physical or logical clock for establishing “temporal order” of the topological change events [23]. 
C. Hybrid Protocols 
These protocols include the good characteristics of both the pro-active and reactive protocols. It aggregates the set of 
nodes into zones in the network topology. As the network is divided into zones, the proactive approach is used within 
each zone for maintenance of routing information. Reactive approach is used for routing packets between different zones. 
ZRP, ZHLS, SLURP, DST, DDR are some of the hybrid routing based protocols. 
  ZRP- Zone Routing Protocol divides the entire network into overlapping zones of variable size. It uses the 
combination of the features of both pro-active and reactive protocols. The proactive protocol helps in ﬁnding zone 
neighbors by instantly sending HELLO messages. The reactive protocol is used for routing purpose between 
different zones, i.e. a route is only established if needed. Each node deﬁnes its own zone size, i.e. number of hops 
to zone perimeter. ZRP even helps in providing a framework for other protocols [24]. 
Below mentioned Table 1 depicts the comparison of the types of routing protocols in MANET based on certain 
parameters like routing structure, requirements(bandwidth, power), overheads (power, control, communication). Table2 
show the varied pro-active routing protocols that differ from one another on certain background characteristics. Table 3 Dhiman  et al., International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Science and Software Engineering 3(10), 
October - 2013, pp. 1-12 
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gives the overview of the reactive protocols and their comparison. Table 4 shows the comparative study of the hybrid 
routing protocols. These protocols have been differentiated on the basis of route selection, number of routes, topology 
formation, updating criteria etc. 
TABLE I 
COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF ROUTING PROTOCOLS [14]-[16] 
 
 
TABLE II 
COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT PRO-ACTIVE ROUTING PROTOCOLS [15], [17] 
 Dhiman  et al., International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Science and Software Engineering 3(10), 
October - 2013, pp. 1-12 
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TABLE III 
COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT REACTIVE ROUTING PROTOCOLS [15], [17] 
 
 
TABLE IV 
COMPARISON OF HYBRID ROUTING PROTOCOLS [14] 
 
   
III.     SECURITY LEAKS 
Security is one of the most important features to be kept in mind while regarding the functionality of the network. The 
routing protocols in MANET have a breach at the level of security due to the following reasons: 
  The wireless links in the MANET make the nodes susceptible to attacks. 
  As the topology changes due to random movement of the nodes, the malicious nodes may join the network and 
degrade its performance.   
  The nodes in MANET co-operate with each other in routing process but sometimes they become malicious and 
non co-operative, resulting in the disruption of the network operation. 
  There is no distinct line of defense in MANET; hence a node can be attacked by internal as well as external 
means. 
  As the nodes in MANET (laptops, mobiles, PDAs) are resource constrained, i.e. their storage capacity, processing 
speed, computational power is limited. Hence, the attackers may be attracted to focus on the new attacks.  
Hence, the nodes act in a selfish manner i.e. they misbehave as they don‟t take part in the routing process. Even if they 
take part in routing, then they don‟t forward the packets meant for the particular destination. This malicious behaviour is 
due to the presence of a particular node‟s selfishness in the network. A node may become selfish due to [3]: 
  Honest reasons- collisions, channel errors, buffer overflows etc. Dhiman  et al., International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Science and Software Engineering 3(10), 
October - 2013, pp. 1-12 
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  Malicious reasons- attacks (black hole, wormhole), network congestion, for saving energy and bandwidth etc.  
When a node becomes selfish or it misbehaves, then it [2]: 
  Simply drops the packets 
  Advertises itself as the shortest route to the destination 
  Sends fake error messages or route requests 
  May not take part in route discovery process 
  Blocks certain data 
  Flooding of the information over the network 
  Misdirect traffic to modify routing protocol 
This misbehaviour could be for energy conservation or gain of unfair share of bandwidth. The selfish node just enjoys 
having a “free ride” to cause “sleep deprivation torture” in the other nodes. 
 
IV.    SECURITY ATTACKS 
Considering the malicious behaviour as the main cause for the node to become selfish, this section gives a detailed 
description of the varied attacks that can be incurred upon the node.  
 
The attacks in MANET are categorized as [13]: 
A. Passive attacks 
These attacks are launched by adversaries just to snoop the information exchanged in the network. They do not disrupt 
the operation of the network but just violate the confidentiality. These are difficult to identify because the network is not 
affected by this type of attack. Eavesdropping, traffic analysis, monitoring, snooping are a few examples of passive 
category. 
B. Active attacks 
These attacks alter and destroy the data being exchanged in the network. They disrupt the normal functioning of the 
network. Active attacks are further categorized into following sub categories [1]- 
  External attacks- These are carried out by the nodes which do not belong to the domain of the network. 
  Internal attacks- These are launched by the compromised nodes present within the network. They are severe to 
detect in comparison to the external attacks.  
 
TABLE V 
ATTACKS AT DIFFERENT LAYERS OF PROTOCOL STACK [11] 
Application layer  Malicious code- virus and worms, repudiation attack 
Transport layer  Session hijacking, SYN attack 
Network layer  Blackhole attack, wormhole attack, byzantine attack, resource consumption, Sybil attack, rushing attach, replay 
attack, link spoofing 
Data link layer  Traffic analysis, monitoring, Disruption of MAC DCF and back off mechanism. 
Physical layer  Eavesdropping, jamming, active interference 
 
A. Attacks at the Physical Layer  
1) Eavesdropping: It is referred as the interception and reading of the messages or data by any unintended user just to 
obtain the confidential information such as private key, public key, location of the nodes, traffic patterns [10][11]. This 
interception is possible only when the user gets tuned to the particular frequency.  
 
Fig. 4 Eavesdropping Dhiman  et al., International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Science and Software Engineering 3(10), 
October - 2013, pp. 1-12 
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2) Jamming: This type of attack is initiated by the malicious node when after monitoring the wireless communication 
between the source and destination for a long time, it gets the frequency of communication. So the attacker/ jammer send 
the signal at that frequency along with certain security threats, hence resulting in the prevention of the reception of the 
legitimate packets at the destination. 
3) Active Interference: It is basically a type of denial of service attack [10] which blocks and distorts the wireless 
communication by changing the order of messages or replays the messages. 
 
B. Attacks at the Data Link Layer 
1) Traffic Analysis and Monitoring: This attack provide the confidential information related to the communication 
parties (sender and receiver) as well as the network topology- location of nodes, role of nodes in communication etc [11]. 
2) Disruption of MAC DCF and Back Off Mechanism: MAC protocols work on the assumption that the nodes co-
operate with each other but the selfish node or the malicious node never works as per the normal operation of the 
protocol. Selfish node interrupts the contention based or reservation based MAC protocols. The attacker corrupts the 
network frame by introducing certain bits or ignoring the ongoing transmission or exploiting the BEB scheme to launch 
denial  of  service  attack  in  IEEE  802.11  MAC.  Here,  the  heavily  loaded  nodes  tend  to  capture  the  channel  by 
continuously transmitting the data which results in lightly loaded nodes to backoff continuously. This chain reaction goes 
on making the NAV field of RTS/CTS handshake more vulnerable, resulting in corruption of the frame over the ongoing 
transmission [1]. 
 
C. Attacks at the Network Layer 
1) Blackhole Attack: A malicious node claims to have an optimum route to the destination node when it receives the 
route  request  „RREQ‟  during  the  route  discovery  process.  The  malicious  node  sends  fake  information  (route  reply 
„RREP‟) to the source node [6].  
 
Fig. 5 Blackhole attack 
 
Taking the following instance, where „S‟ and „D‟ are the source and destination nodes respectively and „M‟ is the 
malicious node. The source node initiates the route discovery process and broadcasts RREQ over the network. The 
malicious node „M‟ on receiving the RREQ immediately responds to S by sending RREP with a higher and modified 
sequence number claiming that it has fresh route to D. The node S receives RREP by „M‟ node earlier than any other 
node. Hence S ignores RREP of other nodes received later and starts sending data packets via M node. Thus, all the 
packets are being swallowed by the malicious node, therefore termed as black hole attack.  
An extension of Black hole attack is “Grayhole Attack” [9] in which the behaviour of malicious node is exceptionally 
unpredictable. It is of further 3 types-  
  Node may behave in a selfish manner for a specific time only. 
  Node may drop packets for certain nodes and forward packets for other nodes. 
  It could be a combination of the above two mentioned scenarios- malicious node may drop packets for certain 
nodes for certain time only. 
2) Wormhole Attack: Even referred as “tunnelling attack” [9] or colluding attack, makes use of two collaborating nodes 
(attackers) that create two or more black holes.  The attacker receives the packet at one point in the network, tunnels them 
to the other point and replays them at another location in the network via high speed wired or wireless link. The routing 
message is disrupted on tunnelling; hence this tunnel between two colluding attackers is called the wormhole attack [7]. 
 
Fig. 6 Wormhole attack Dhiman  et al., International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Science and Software Engineering 3(10), 
October - 2013, pp. 1-12 
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In figure 6, node S and D are the source node and destination node respectively. When S wants to send data to the 
node D, it initiates the route discovery process by broadcasting RREQ. When node 1 receives RREQ, it encapsulates 
route request and tunnels it to node 2 through existing data route, i.e. S-1-3-4-5-2. Node 2 receives encapsulated RREQ 
for D, and then it reveals that it has only traversed S-1-2-D. None of the nodes (1 and 2) have updated their packet header. 
The node D finds two routes towards S node but of unequal length. 
S-1-2-D of length 3 and S-1-3-4-5-D of length 4 
D will chose shorter route S-1-2-D to unicast RREP towards S. hence S will select the path that passes through node 1 
and 2 to send its data. 
3) Byzantine  Attack:  A compromised intermediate  node works in collusion and carries out the attack by creating 
routing loops, forwarding of the packets on the non-optimal path and selective dropping [12]. Hence, resulting in the 
disruption and degradation of the routing services. 
 
Fig. 7 Dropping of packets by „M‟ in byzantine attack 
 
In the above figure, the malicious node „M‟ receives route request from source node „A‟. But, „M‟ selectively drops 
certain data packets or it just forwards the data packets to a non optimal route. This is how the byzantine attack is formed 
in MANETs. 
4) Sinkhole Attack: In this type of attack, the malicious node advertises wrong routing information to produce itself as a 
specific node and receives the whole network traffic [11]. It modifies the data packets by changing the sequence number 
or drops them. Hence, the path through malicious node „M‟ appears to be the best available path. 
 
Fig. 8 Sinkhole attack 
 
5) Sybil Attack: The malicious node „M‟ produces itself as the large number of independent nodes called „Sybil nodes‟ 
which generate fake identities for new nodes or steal identity of the legitimate nodes [4]. 
6) Rushing Attack: It is a kind of routing attack which exploits duplicate suppression mechanism by quickly forwarding 
the route discovery packets in order to gain access to the forwarding groups [12]. When the compromised node receives 
the RREQ from the source node, it floods packet to all the nodes in the network at faster rate than any other node. 
 
Fig. 9 Rushing attack Dhiman  et al., International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Science and Software Engineering 3(10), 
October - 2013, pp. 1-12 
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7) Resource Consumption Attack:  It is a type of flooding attack or sleep deprivation attack [8] in which attacker or the 
compromised node attempts to consume the resources like battery power, bandwidth, computational power by keeping 
the victim node busy in asking it for favours by requesting excessive route discovery and forwarding the unnecessary 
packets to victim node.  
 
Fig. 10 Resource consumption attack (sleep deprivation attack) 
 
In the above figure, where „M‟ is the malicious node, it keeps on forwarding excessive requests to the victim nodes 
„C‟,‟D‟ and „E‟. This results in the decrease in battery power of the nodes. 
8) Replay Attack: As MANETs don‟t have a fixed topology, so the attacker can take advantage by recording the other 
node‟s valid control messages and resends them later. This causes other nodes to record their routing table with stale 
routes. Hence, replay attack is used to impersonate a specific node or to disturb the routing information in MANET [7]. 
 
Fig. 11  Replay attack 
 
9) Link Withholding and Link Spoofing Attack: Link withholding attack is commonly found in OLSR protocol [7] in 
which a malicious node does not broadcast any information about the links to the specific nodes, resulting in the loss of 
link to those nodes.  
In link spoofing attack, a malicious node advertises false links to the non- neighbouring nodes (target node‟s two hop 
neighbour) [7], [11]. This results in disruption of the normal operation of the network by manipulating the data or routing 
traffic. 
 
Fig. 12  Link spoofing attack 
 
In figure 12, „A‟ is the attacker node and “T‟ is the target node. Before the attack, node A and B are selected as 
multipoint relay nodes for node T. In the link spoofing attack, node A advertises to have a false link to node „D‟ (two hop 
neighbour of node T). Hence, T will select the malicious node „A‟ as its multipoint relay node because A is in the 
minimum set to reach T‟s two hop neighbour. Node T will start sending data through node A which will drop or withhold 
the routing traffic generated by node T [7]. 
10) Jellyfish Attack: It is a type of forwarding disruption attack [8] in which TCP flows are considered to be closed-
loop flows. This attack is targeted against closed loops. As TCP is vulnerable to dropping, delaying and disordering of 
the packets, hence Jellyfish attack acts as a passive attack in diminishing the output by dropping the data packets. It is 
categorized as under: 
                     
  Fig. 13 (a) Types of Jellyfish attack                                    Fig. 13 (b) Jellyfish attack periodic dropping Dhiman  et al., International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Science and Software Engineering 3(10), 
October - 2013, pp. 1-12 
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In the figure 13 (b), the malicious node „M‟ selectively drops certain data packets, hence resulting in the Jellyfish 
Periodic Dropping Attack. 
 
D. Attacks at the Transport Layer 
1) Session Hijacking: It is assumed that at the setup of the session, the communication is protected but session hijack 
attack exploits this assumption when an attacker spoofs the IP address of the victim and finds out the correct sequence 
number. Hence, it impersonates the victim node and continues session with it [1].  
 
Fig. 14  Session hijacking (TCP ACK storm) 
 
Figure 14 depicts that the launch of session hijack attack results in TCP ACK storm problem. The attacker node sends 
injected session data and node A acknowledges the receipt of data by sending an ACK packet to node B. This ACK 
packet will not contain a sequence number expected by node B; hence B will send an ACK packet containing expected 
sequence number for synchronization. This cycle repeats itself, thus causing ACK packets to go back and forth and 
resulting in ACK storm. 
2) SYN Flooding Attack: A type of denial of service attack [11] resulting in half opened TCP connections with the 
victim node which never complete the handshake to fully open the connection. 3-way handshake is necessary for two 
nodes  to  communicate  by  TCP.  There  are  three  messages  in  it-  SYN  packet  depicting  request  for  synchronization 
containing  the  sequence  number  „X‟  of  the  message,  SYN/ACK  packet  with  a  sequence  number  „P‟  having 
acknowledgement number „X+1‟ and ACK packet with acknowledgement number „P+1‟ [1]. 
 
 
Fig. 15 (a) Normal TCP 3-way handshake, (b) and (c) represent SYN flood attack 
 
When the attack is launched by the malicious node, a large number of SYN packets are sent to the victim node 
spoofing the return address of SYN packets. On receiving the SYN packets, receiver node (victim) sends the SYN-ACK 
packets and waits for certain time for the response of ACK packets. If there is no response of the ACK packets, the half 
opened  connections  in  the  fixed-size  table  remain  stored  within  the  victim  node.  These  pending  connections  then 
overflow the buffer and the victim node may not be able to receive legitimate requests to open the connection. As there is Dhiman  et al., International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Science and Software Engineering 3(10), 
October - 2013, pp. 1-12 
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always a time out associated with the pending connections, these half open connections expire and the victim node 
recovers. But still, the malicious node continues sending the packets requesting for new connections at a faster rate than 
the expiring time of the pending connections [1]. 
E. Attacks at the Application Layer  
1) Malicious Code Attack: It involves viruses, worms, Trojan horses and spywares attacking the operating system and 
user application. For example- Code Red Worm is an IP address scanning worm [1] generating probe packets to the 
vulnerable UDP/TCP port. Hosts which have been hit respond and receive a copy of the worm, hence getting infected.  
2) Repudiation Attack: As the term „repudiation‟ refers to the denial of participation by the nodes in all or part of the 
communication, this attack deals in denying of the malicious or selfish node for conducting any operation in the network. 
Example- In commercial systems, selfish person can deny conducting any online transaction. 
 
TABLE VI  
ATTACKS AND CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES 
V.    CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Sr. 
No. 
Attack  Characteristic feature 
1  Eavesdropping  Reading and interception of confidential information especially keys when tuned 
to particular frequency 
2  Jamming  At particular frequency, certain signals are sent for preventing the reception of 
legitimate packets 
3  Active interference  Change in the order of messages or replay the messages 
4  Traffic  analysis  and 
monitoring 
Confidential information like topology perceived 
5  Disruption  of  MAC  DCF  and 
back off mechanism 
Exploit BEB algorithm and interrupt contention window resulting in light loaded 
nodes to back off 
6  Blackhole attack  Malicious node sends fake RREP to the source and swallows all the packets 
7  Wormhole attack  Colluding nodes prevent the data transfer to the destined node by tunnelling the 
packets among themselves 
8  Byzantine attack  Malicious  node creates routing loops or forwarding of the packets on the non-
optimal path and selective dropping 
9  Sinkhole attack  Whole network traffic is drawn towards a single node (selfish in nature) 
10  Sybil attack  Malicious node produces itself as a number of independent „Sybil‟ nodes 
11  Rushing attack  Selfish node floods the packets to all the nodes in the network at a faster rate than 
any other node 
12  Resource consumption  Excessive  requests  are  sent  to  the  victim  node  by  selfish  node  for  routing 
discovery and packet forwarding 
13  Replay attack  Attacker keeps a record of the stale routes in the routing table 
14  Link  with-hold  and  link 
spoofing attack 
Loss of legitimate links/disruption of the links, fake links to non-neighbouring 
nodes 
15  Jellyfish attack  Forwarding disruption attack resulting in packet disorder, dropping and delaying. 
16  Session hijacking  Spoof IP address of the victim by sending acknowledgement with a different 
sequence no. 
17  SYN flooding  Half opened connections due to large no. of SYN packets 
18  Malicious code attack  Deals in virus, worms and Trojan horse 
19  Repudiation attack  Denial of any communication or transaction 
 Dhiman  et al., International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Science and Software Engineering 3(10), 
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In this paper, we have thrown light on the MANET characteristics and routing protocols needed for route creation and 
data forwarding in MANET. Several issues related to the security leaks have been discussed. The breaches in the security 
results in various attacks (malicious aspect) in MANET which is the main cause for making a node “selfish”. The “selfish 
node” has become a major problem for ad hoc network as the selfish node enjoys free ride without compromising its own 
resources and hence affects the network performance.  In our future work, we will be emphasizing more on the selfish 
node attack- defence mechanism. Till now, many approaches have been developed for the detection and isolation of these 
selfish nodes but these mechanisms do not take into account the overhead caused. Our research would be focussed on 
proposing and developing a defence mechanism with reduced overhead for the detection and prevention of selfish node 
attack. 
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